Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 102 | Issue 4

Article 4

Fall 2012

Prosecutorial Discretion, Hidden Costs, and the
Death Penalty: The Case of Los Angeles County
Nicholas Petersen
Mona Lynch

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Nicholas Petersen and Mona Lynch, Prosecutorial Discretion, Hidden Costs, and the Death Penalty: The Case of Los Angeles County, 102 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 1233 (2013).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol102/iss4/4

This Criminology is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

0091-4169/13/10204-1233
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright © 2012 by Northwestern University School of Law

Vol. 102, No. 4
Printed in U.S.A.

CRIMINOLOGY
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION, HIDDEN
COSTS, AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE
CASE OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY
NICHOLAS PETERSEN * AND MONA LYNCH****
This Article analyzes the processing of homicide cases in Los Angeles
County from 1996 to 2008 to measure the time-costs of pursuing cases
capitally and to examine how prosecutorial discretion in homicide charging
is exercised in this jurisdiction. To answer these questions, we explore two
related outcomes: (1) the odds of a “death-notice” filing and (2) time-toresolution. According to Model 1, death-eligible cases with multiple
special circumstances are significantly more likely to be prosecuted
capitally than those with only one special circumstance. In light of the
limited financial information regarding capital punishment at the county
level, Models 2–4 utilize Cox Proportional Hazard regression to investigate
the time-costs associated with death eligibility. 1 Estimates indicate that
capital cases take significantly longer to reach resolution than noncapital
cases. Furthermore, the filing of special circumstances increases survival
time in noncapital cases. In addition to highlighting the time-costs of trying
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1
CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE (CCFAJ), REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA 34–43,
77–84, 96–104 (June 30, 2008) [hereinafter CCFAJ], available at http://www.ccfaj.org/
documents/reports/dp/official/FINAL%20REPORT%20DEATH%20PENALTY.pdf; SUSAN
S. EVERINGHAM, RAND CORP., Ser. No. CT 300, INVESTIGATING THE COSTS OF THE DEATH
PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA: INSIGHTS FOR FUTURE DATA COLLECTION FROM A PRELIMINARY
RAND EFFORT 1 (2008) (relating testimony before the Cal. Comm’n on the Fair Admin. of
Justice on Feb. 20, 2008).
**
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cases capitally, these findings reveal the time-costs associated with the
prosecution of special circumstance cases, even when the death penalty is
not ultimately sought. By examining capital costs at the county level, this
analysis contributes to the ongoing policy reform debate in California that
aims to address the state’s “dysfunctional” death penalty system. 2
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 27, 2004, the California Commission on the Fair
Administration of Justice (CCFAJ) was established by California State
Senate Resolution Number 44 to conduct a comprehensive review of
California’s criminal justice system. The commission was charged with
three overarching tasks: (1) examine past failures of the state’s criminal
justice system, particularly wrongful convictions and executions; (2) review
potential strategies for improving the criminal justice system, including
adding safeguards against miscarriages of justice; and (3) propose
legislative reforms that will improve fairness and justice in the state. 3
After four years of work, the CCFAJ published its final report in 2008.
The bulk of the final report focused on issues facing the state’s capital
punishment system, which the commission characterized as “broken” in
terms of its economic costs, the quality of justice it affords, and the toll it
takes on other aspects of criminal justice administration in the state.4
Specifically, the report identified a range of flaws in the system, explored
alternatives to capital punishment, and proposed legislative reforms. 5 A
key finding was that excessive delays and overbroad prosecutorial
discretion plagued California’s death penalty system. 6 Ultimately, though,
the report indicated that due to serious gaps in data-collection efforts within
the state, further research on the costs of capital punishment is necessary,
particularly on pretrial and presentencing costs, in order to develop
appropriate remedial policies. 7
This study attempts to answer the CCFAJ’s call for further research on
the problems associated with California’s death penalty system at the trial
level by examining the processing of homicide cases in one jurisdiction—
Los Angeles County—from 1996 to 2008. We investigate the practices and
2

CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 3, 6.
Id. at 1.
4
Id. at 4–7.
5
Id. at 5–15. See generally id. at 60–104 (discussing the financial and procedural
implications of reforming California’s death penalty system by narrowing the list of special
circumstances or replacing capital punishment with life in prison without the possibility of
parole).
6
Id. at 21–27, 102–04.
7
Id. at 34–43, 77–84, 96–102.
3
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patterns of prosecutorial discretion in homicide case processing in order to
better understand the associated costs and consequences of the capital
punishment system prior to final adjudication.
In the next section, we provide a brief overview of the failures of
California’s “modern” death penalty system, 8 in part by describing in more
detail the findings of the CCFAJ panel. To contextualize these failures, we
begin with a brief sketch of the mechanics of California’s homicide and
capital sentencing laws and how they are typically applied in Los Angeles
County, the site of our study. We follow with a review of the death penalty
cost literature, highlighting the ways in which methodological limitations
may restrict the utility of existing estimates in notable ways. Within this
section, we specifically examine the role of prosecutorial discretion in
seeking the death penalty and the potential economic and justice costs
associated with the breadth of discretion afforded to prosecutors.
Next, we provide an overview of our methodological framework used
to estimate the time-costs of California’s capital punishment system at the
county level. Data on Los Angeles County homicide cases filed from 1996
to 2008 were used to formulate multiple regression models predicting: (1)
the odds of a “death-notice” filing and (2) time-to-resolution. We conclude
by addressing the public policy relevancy of our findings, as well as their
implications for how criminal justice resources are allocated and for broader
goals of justice. Here, we place the California case within the context of the
penological justifications for capital punishment, which have, in recent
years, been challenged by the accumulation of countervailing empirical
evidence indicating that the death penalty is ineffective as either a deterrent
or a method of incapacitation. 9

8

The “modern” era of capital punishment refers to the post-Furman (1972) period when
states redrafted their death penalty laws in an effort to reinstate capital punishment with
constitutionally sound statutes that addressed the infirmities identified in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972). Not all states that tried came up with constitutionally viable schemes
initially; California’s first post-Furman statute was found unconstitutional. Steven F. Shatz
& Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1283, 1307–10 (1997). The core of the current statute was put into effect in 1978 as a
result of a voter initiative. See id. at 1310–17. See generally CCFAJ at 17–18 (discussing
the history of California’s “modern” death penalty statute, particularly the broadening of
death eligibility over time).
9
Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal
Reasoning on Capital Punishment, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY: AN
AGENDA FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT RESEARCH 311, 342 (Charles
S. Lanier et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY];
Michael L. Radelet, The Executioner’s Waning Defenses, in THE ROAD TO ABOLITION?: THE
FUTURE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 19, 24 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. &
Austin Sarat eds., 2009).
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A. THE FAILURES OF CALIFORNIA’S DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM
In California, criminal homicides are divided into two categories—
manslaughter and murder. Manslaughter, which can take several different
forms, is defined as the “unlawful killing of a human being without
malice.” 10 Murder is defined as “the unlawful killing of a human being, or
a fetus, with malice aforethought.” 11 Varying degrees of murder are
distinguished based on the presence or absence of premeditation. Firstdegree murder consists of premeditated killings or killings in the course of a
specified felony, and only first-degree murders that involve at least one of
the twenty-two special circumstance allegations (which themselves have
numerous subcategories of eligibility) enumerated in California Penal Code
(PC) §190.2 qualify for the death penalty. 12 Thus, a special circumstance
allegation requires an accompanying charge of first-degree murder.
The criminal justice processing of homicides begins when a killing is
reported to the police.13 Once a homicide is “cleared by arrest,” it is
eligible for prosecution. A homicide is considered to be “cleared by arrest
or solved, for crime reporting purposes, when at least one person is arrested,
charged with the commission of an offense, and turned over to a court for
prosecution.” 14 The district attorney’s (DA) office then decides whether or
not charges will be filed. The decision to file criminal charges shapes the
course of the case in fundamental ways, setting in motion a series of
criminal proceedings.
In Los Angeles County, a deputy DA makes the initial charging
decisions. 15 If the deputy DA charges the defendant(s) with first-degree
murder and at least one special circumstance allegation, the case becomes
potentially death eligible. 16
10

CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 2008).
PENAL § 187(a).
12
PENAL § 190.2; Shiva Shirazi Davoudian, California Homicide Law: The Basics, 36
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1371, 1391 (2003).
13
See infra Figure 1.
14
CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE IN CALIFORNIA 2010, at 50 (2010), available at
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/pdfs/cjsc/publications/homicide/hm10/preface.pdf.
15
Letter from Natasha Minsker, Death Penalty Director, Am. Civil Liberties Union of
Northern Cal., to John Van de Kamp, Chair, Cal. Comm’n on the Fair Admin. of Justice
(Feb. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Letter from Natasha Minsker], available at http://ccfaj.org/
documents/reports/dp/expert/ACLUDAChargingPracticesLetter.pdf.
16
As used here, “death eligible” refers to a case involving at least one special
circumstance allegation, but not necessarily involving the filing of a death notice.
Throughout this paper, the term death eligible refers to all cases involving a special
circumstance (both capital and noncapital) unless otherwise specified. A “capital case” or
“death penalty case” refers to one in which both a special circumstance allegation and a
death notice have been filed. The term “special circumstance case” applies to cases
involving one or more special circumstances, but no death notice. “Non-special
11
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Figure 1 17
Processing of Homicide Cases in Los Angeles County
Homicide Reported
Homicide is “cleared by arrest”
Homicide is not solved or “cleared exceptionally”
Charges Filed by Deputy DA
Homicide Charges Filed
First-degree murder charged†
Second-degree murder or lesser offense charged*
Special Circumstance Allegations
Special circumstance(s) are filed‡
No special circumstance(s) are filed*
Preliminary Hearing
Death notice is filed‡
No death notice is filed*
Case Disposition
Trial‡
Plea Bargain*
Dismissal*
Verdict at Guilt Trial
Guilty of first-degree murder and at least one special circumstance‡
Not guilty of first-degree murder or at least one special
circumstance*
Sentence at Penalty Trial
Life without the possibility of parole (LWOP)
Death sentence
Legend: *non-death-eligible case; †potentially death-eligible case;
‡death-eligible case.
Upon completion of a preliminary hearing, the “special circumstance
committee” recommends whether or not a death notice should be filed. The
special circumstance committee chair reviews this recommendation and
circumstance case” refers to a case without any special circumstance allegation.
17
The information contained in Figure 1 can be found at: David Baldus et al.,
Perspectives, Approaches, and Future Directions in Death Penalty Proportionality Studies,
in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 135, 136 fig.1; H. MITCHELL
CALDWELL ET AL., DEATH PENALTY SURVEY REPORT 5–7 (2007), available at http://www.
ccfaj.org/documents/reports/dp/expert/Pepperdine-CaldwellResearch.pdf; LINDA E. CARTER
ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 95–103 (2008); Philip J. Cook, Potential
Savings from Abolition of the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
498, 513 fig.3 (2009); Letter from Natasha Minsker, supra note 15, at 5 (Chart 1), 8 (Chart
2).
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makes a final determination as to whether or not the death penalty will be
sought.
At any point during this process, the prosecution may offer the defense
a plea agreement. If the defense agrees to a negotiated plea, the case results
in a guilty plea to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) or a lesser
sentence.
If no plea bargain is offered or an agreement is not reached, the case
proceeds to trial. Capital trials are bifurcated, consisting of a guilt phase
and a penalty phase. In order to advance to a penalty trial and qualify for
the death penalty, the jury must find the defendant(s) guilty of both firstdegree murder and at least one special circumstance allegation during the
guilt phase. At the penalty trial, jurors hear case-specific aggravating and
mitigating evidence before receiving instructions on the process that should
be used to weigh that evidence when rendering a sentence of death or
LWOP. 18
The current scheme for selecting death-eligible murders from the
larger category of first-degree murders was originally authorized in 1978,
when California voters passed the so-called Briggs Death Penalty Initiative
Act. State senator John Briggs, who was one of the initiative’s authors,
touted the law as the “toughest” death penalty law in the nation. 19 It
derived most of its “toughness” from its very broad definitions of the types
of murder that would be eligible for capital prosecution. 20
While both state and federal appeals courts have held that California’s
death penalty statute is constitutional, its application since first being put
into practice has been anything but ideal. Indeed, it has been called, by no
less than a federal circuit court judge, a multibillion dollar “debacle” and
“fraud” perpetrated on California taxpayers. 21 Since 1978, prosecutors in
the state have sought thousands of death sentences, hundreds of capitally
charged defendants have been sent to death row, and thirteen executions
have been carried out. As of mid-year 2012, 725 condemned persons
populated the state’s overcrowded and decrepit death row, 22 yet executions
remain on hold in the state as the latest lethal injection protocol has been
18
Steven F. Shatz, The Eighth Amendment, the Death Penalty, and Ordinary RobberyBurglary Murderers: A California Case Study, 59 FLA. L. REV. 719, 724 (2007).
19
Id. at 728.
20
Id. at 729.
21
Judge Arthur L. Alarcón & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the Will of the Voters?: A
Roadmap to Mend or End the California Legislature’s Multi-Billion-Dollar Death Penalty
Debacle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. S41, S41 (2011).
22
CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., DEATH ROW TRACKING SYSTEM: CONDEMNED INMATE
LIST (SECURE) (July 2, 2012) [hereinafter CONDEMNED INMATE LIST], available at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/docs/CondemnedInmateListSecure.pdf.
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deemed unconstitutional by a state court judge. 23 The average time from
judgment to execution in California is seventeen years and growing longer
annually; this wait is well above the national average.24
At the core of many of California’s problems with the death penalty is
the breadth of the original sentencing statute, which has only grown broader
since 1978. 25 In 1997, Shatz and Rivkind raised the question of whether
California’s statute adequately narrowed the pool of death-eligible cases, as
was mandated in Furman v. Georgia. 26 Their analysis of case facts in a
sample of California homicide convictions appealed from 1988 to 1992
indicated that seven out of every eight noncapital first-degree murder cases
would factually qualify for the death penalty under California’s statute,
thereby rendering the state’s death-eligibility criterion even more arbitrary
and capricious than the one deemed unconstitutional prior to Furman. 27
They did a closer examination of all first- and second-degree murder
convictions in three California counties, and found a similar proportion of
cases that would be death eligible under the statute.28
Beyond this justice concern with California’s statute, another
consequence of having an overbroad “narrowing” scheme is that
prosecutors’ charging power is thereby increased. Special circumstances
can be filed in most first-degree murder cases in order to leverage guilty
pleas; 29 overzealous prosecutors can actively seek the death penalty in cases
that would not warrant such action in other counties, thus creating
interjurisdictional disparities; 30 extralegal factors, such as defendant and
victim demographic characteristics, as well as political pressures, can more

23

AA1.
24

Carol J. Williams, New Lethal Injection Rules Tossed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011, at

CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 22. See generally id. at 21–27 (reviewing empirical findings
regarding delays in California’s death penalty system).
25
Shatz, supra note 18, at 728; Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 8, at 1326, 1339–41.
26
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).
27
In Zant v. Stephens, the Court noted that aggravating circumstances should narrow the
pool of death-eligible defendants; yet aggravating circumstances do not necessarily need to
guide juror discretion at the sentencing stage. 462 U.S. 862, 877–78 (1983); Chelsea Creo
Sharon, The ‘Most Deserving’ of Death: The Narrowing Requirement and the Proliferation
of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 223, 230
(2011).
28
Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 8, at 1334–35.
29
Susan Ehrhard, Plea Bargaining and the Death Penalty: An Exploratory Study, 29
JUST. SYS. J. 313, 314 (2008).
30
CALDWELL ET AL., supra note 17, at 5–6; ELLEN S. KREITZBERG, CAL. COMM’N ON THE
FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN CALIFORNIA DEATH
PENALTY CASES (2008), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/dp/expert/
Kreitzberg.pdf; Letter from Natasha Minsker, supra note 15.
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easily creep into the decisionmaking process; 31 and local jurisdictions can
suffer the resource drains caused by increased threats of a death-notice
filing, which leads to dramatically higher case expenses. 32
One way that these resource costs materialize is in case delays and
lengthy time-to-resolution. Indeed, the CCFAJ report noted that capital
cases likely take longer to reach resolution than noncapital cases since they
require more preparation, but the Commission could only speculate about
the specific preconviction time-costs:
The decision to seek the death penalty in a pending murder prosecution triggers a
number of consequences that affect the duration, complexity and cost of the trial
proceedings. Death penalty trials clearly take longer and cost more than murder trials
in which the death penalty is not sought. Unfortunately, we have only a rough
33
estimate of how many death penalty trials are taking place each year in California.

Attorney salaries represent a large portion of the costs associated with
capital punishment at the county level, yet prosecutors and defense
attorneys are not required to keep track of their expenses. 34 Moreover,
county-level attorneys report that “there is no such thing as a typical
homicide case,” thereby making cost estimates based on officials’ “best
guess” of “average” homicide cases subject to measurement error.35 Statelevel costs are equally difficult to estimate since the California Supreme
Court does not maintain records on the time dedicated to the handling of
31

Catherine Lee, Hispanics and the Death Penalty: Discriminatory Charging Practices
in San Joaquin County, California, 35 J. CRIM. JUST. 17, 21 (2007); Glenn L. Pierce &
Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for
California Homicides, 1990–1999, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 19–36 (2005) [hereinafter
The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors]; Robert E. Weiss et al., Assessing the
Capriciousness of Death Penalty Charging, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 607, 611 (1996); Robert
Weiss et al., Death Penalty Charging in Los Angeles County: An Illustrative Data Analysis
Using Skeptical Priors, 28 SOC. METHODS & RES. 91, 114 (1999).
32
Katherine Baicker, The Budgetary Repercussions of Capital Convictions, 4 ADVANCES
ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 3, 10, 13 (2004); Ashley Rupp, Death Penalty Prosecutorial
Charging Decisions and County Budgetary Restrictions: Is the Death Penalty Arbitrarily
Applied Based on County Funding?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2735, 2752, 2758–61 (2002).
33
CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 34. In 2006, the CCFAJ hired the RAND Corporation to
evaluate whether or not it was possible to estimate accurately the costs associated with
California’s capital punishment system. EVERINGHAM, supra note 1, at 1, 6–8. Criminal
justice officials at the state and county levels were interviewed in an effort to gauge the
availability of financial data on California capital cases. Id. Based on these interviews,
RAND concluded that it was unfeasible to calculate costs due to the lack of readily available
financial information. Id.
34
Id. at 5; NATASHA MINSKER, ACLU OF N. CAL., THE HIDDEN DEATH TAX: THE SECRET
COSTS OF SEEKING EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA 39 (2012) [hereinafter THE HIDDEN DEATH
TAX], available at http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/death_penalty/the_hidden_
death_tax.pdf.
35
EVERINGHAM, supra note 1, at 5.
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capital versus noncapital cases.
In the end, the CCFAJ was only able to offer rough estimates of capital
punishment costs in California. The Commission estimated that California
currently spends $137.7 million on death-penalty-related costs each year.36
This estimate was divided into pretrial and trial costs at $20 million
annually, $54.4 million each year for the cost of state-level appeal and
habeas proceedings, and confinement costs at $63.3 million annually. The
Commission was unable to calculate the costs of federal habeas corpus
proceedings. 37
The CCFAJ panel also raised the issue of overbroad charging practices
as a contributory factor in the system’s failures. However, the panel was
unable to systematically examine patterns in special circumstance filings
throughout California, as there is no statewide database of prosecutorial
charging decisions, or any mandate or mechanism for data collection
whatsoever. 38 As such, the panel was forced to rely on studies that
examined the special circumstance allegations filed only against current
death-row inmates, or ones that looked at special circumstance filings in
just a limited number of jurisdictions. 39
After reviewing these and other findings, the CCFAJ panel pinpointed
the “felony-murder” special circumstance as particularly problematic and
recommended that the legislature remove felony-murder from the list of
special circumstance allegations.40 Indeed, the report suggested limiting
death eligibility to five crime types: (1) murder of a law-enforcement
officer; (2) murders occurring at correctional facilities; (3) multiple
murders; (4) murders involving excessive torture; and (5) murder of
witnesses, jurors, judges, prosecutors, and investigators. 41 Its concerns with
the felony-murder special circumstance were empirically justified: Shatz
found that while a large proportion of death sentences were sought in
felony-murder cases, the rate of obtaining death sentences was
exceptionally low (higher only than for “lying in wait”).42 For the most
common felony-murder cases—burglary-murder and robbery-murder—the
death sentence rate was a mere 5%. 43
36

CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 10, 83–84.
Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 21, at S109–S110; see also CCFAJ, supra note 1, at
84 (providing state, but not federal, habeas costs).
38
CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 96–101.
39
Id. at 64. See generally id. at 60–77 (reviewing studies examining special
circumstances filed against defendants sentenced to death in California).
40
Id. at 62.
41
Id. at 61–62.
42
Shatz, supra note 18, at 745.
43
Id.
37
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The Commission also analyzed three potential remedies to fix the
current capital punishment system, and considered the relative costs and/or
savings of each. First, it suggested that legislative reforms to the current
system aimed at improving justice would cost an additional $95 million,
bringing the total annual rate to $232.7 million. 44 The option of narrowing
death eligibility to the five types of special circumstance allegations listed
above was estimated to potentially lower the annual cost of the death
penalty to $130 million. 45 Finally, the option of replacing the death penalty
with a system of LWOP would bring down annual costs to an estimated
$11.5 million. 46 The Commission again qualified all of these estimates,
stating that “it is impossible to ascertain the precise costs of the
administration of California’s death penalty law at this time. But the
choices that California faces require some comparison of projected costs;
for this purpose, rough estimates will have to do.” 47
In order to assess the costs associated with capital cases and other
related policy concerns, the panel called for the establishment of a statewide
data-collection system. 48 It was recommended that the state legislature
impose requirements on courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys to collect
information on special circumstance filings, death-notice filings, and case
dispositions (e.g., dismissal, plea, verdict, etc.). 49 It was further proposed
that the state formulate a “Death Penalty Review Panel” composed of
various criminal justice officials to review California’s death penalty
system on an annual basis. 50
Despite the clear message conveyed in the CCFAJ report, the
California legislature has remained recalcitrant on the issue of the death
penalty, making it “clear that the future of California’s death penalty is now
up to the voters.” 51 California Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye conveyed
a similar sentiment when asked about the future of the state’s death penalty
system: “That really is up to the voters or to the Legislature . . . .” 52 As a
result of the legislature’s unwillingness and/or inability to implement
reforms—even just those that would allow accurate data collection—a
measure (Proposition 34) was placed on the November 2012 ballot allowing
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

A1.

CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 10, 83–84.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 13, 94.
Id. at 14, 102.
Id. at 13, 102.
Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 21, at S47–S48.
Maura Doland, State’s Death Penalty Not ‘Working,’ L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2011, at
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California voters to determine the future of the state’s death penalty system.
Senator Hancock, Proposition 34’s founder, largely marketed the measure
as a cost-saving initiative, claiming that it would save the state millions of
dollars annually, much of which would be redirected to other public-safety
efforts. 53
B. WHAT DOES THE DEATH PENALTY COST?
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court underscored the uniqueness
of capital cases by explicating the “death is different” doctrine.54 This
doctrine requires the implementation of numerous procedural safeguards in
capital cases to ensure that constitutional standards are achieved. Nearly
three decades of scholarship indicate that the procedural safeguards
implemented in capital cases make them cost significantly more than
noncapital murder cases.55 Yet even with the current level of safeguards in
place, miscarriages of justice persist. 56 Indeed, the decision to seek the
death penalty fundamentally alters the course of an “average” homicide
case, setting in motion an entire chain of events that requires the allocation
of extra resources at the county and state levels, even if the case ultimately
results in a sentence less than death.57
At the pretrial and trial stages, capital cases involve a number of
unique procedures, including, ideally, the appointment of specialized and
experienced attorneys—generally two per case; the investigation of a
defendant’s life history, which often requires the use of expert consultants;
individualized juror “death-qualification” voir dire in addition to standard
voir dire; and a two-part trial consisting of a guilt phase and a punishment
phase. 58 In addition, the state incurs a number of postconviction costs in
death sentence cases due the complex appeal process, which typically
involves three avenues for redress, and can raise issues from both the guilt
and penalty phases of the trial. There is an automatic direct appeal (which
53

California Legislative Hearings: Assembly Appropriations Committee (4 of 5), THE
CAL. CHANNEL (Aug. 17, 2011) [hereinafter California Legislative Hearings],
http://www.calchannel.com/legacy-archive/ (search Archive 01/2009–03/2012 for “assembly
appropriations committee” and select the hyperlink with video title “Assembly
Appropriations Committee (4 of 5)” and date “08/17/2011”).
54
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
55
Jonathan E. Gradess & Andrew L. B. Davies, The Cost of the Death Penalty in
America: Directions for Future Research, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY,
supra note 9, at 397, 398.
56
JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973–
1995, at 3 (2000); JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS SO
MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 5–7 (2002).
57
Letter from Natasha Minsker, supra note 15, at 8.
58
Gradess & Davies, supra note 55, at 398.
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in California is directly to the California Supreme Court), as well as
opportunities to file habeas corpus petitions at the state and federal levels,
which again require considerable expertise and resources. 59 The costs of
housing the condemned on death row are also susbtantially higher than they
are for general-population prisoners, due to security needs and related
expenses. 60 In additon, the infrastructure costs associated with the
functioning of the courts, including the salaries of court officials (e.g.,
attorneys, judges, etc.) is significantly increased by the existence of the
death penalty caseload.61
In the mid-1980s, the cost of trying a California capital case was an
estimated $201,510 more than a noncapital trial, excluding pretrial or
appeal costs. 62 An article in the Sacramento Bee from that time period
estimated that California would save an estimated $90 million annually if
capital punishment were abolished.63 More recent estimates published by
Alarcón and Mitchell indicate that a total of about $4 billion has been spent
by the state and federal governments on California death penalty cases from
1978 to 2010. 64 This $4 billion figure includes pretrial, trial, appellate, and
incarceration costs; nearly half was attributable to presentencing costs
incurred at the county level. 65
Although these kinds of cost-comparison studies are enlightening, they
often suffer from several methodological limitations, including: small
sample sizes, omitted variable bias, selection bias, and narrow periods of
These analyses usually derive financial estimates by
analysis. 66
extrapolating costs associated with a small sample of “typical” or “average”
death penalty cases to the entire universe of death penalty or death-eligible
cases. They then compare the total costs of death penalty cases versus nondeath penalty cases rather than statistically controlling for additional factors
that may affect the cost differential between these types of cases (e.g.,

59

CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 21.
Id. at 69–70.
61
Gradess & Davies, supra note 55, at 406–08 (discussing infrastructure costs). See
generally id. at 399–406 (discussing the death penalty infrastructure costs that are incurred at
the local level, even when cases are not prosecuted capitally).
62
Margot Garey, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars and Sense of the Death Penalty, 18
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1222, 1221 (1985).
63
Stephen Magagnini, Closing Death Row Would Save State $90 Million a Year,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 28, 1988, at A1.
64
Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 21, at S41.
65
Id. at 62.
66
John K. Roman et al., Reassessing the Cost of the Death Penalty Using QuasiExperimental Methods: Evidence from Maryland, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 530, 531 (2009)
[hereinafter Reassessing the Cost of the Death Penalty].
60
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number of defendants, seriousness of the crime, etc.).67 Failing to control
for additional cost-related factors may artificially inflate cost estimates due
to omitted variable bias. In other words, cost differences that may actually
stem from other case factors (e.g., number of defendants, offense severity,
etc.) are attributed to the filing of a death notice because these important
covariates are not estimated. 68 These models also suffer from selection bias
since they focus on a small sample of death penalty cases rather than the
full universe of homicide cases.69
In recent years, more sophisticated studies looking at various death
penalty jurisdictions have attempted to overcome these methodological
shortcomings by utilizing multiple regression and quasi-experimental
techniques. Cook et al.’s study of North Carolina capital cases represents
one of the first attempts to calculate the costs associated with each
component of the death penalty system through the use of multiple
regression techniques. 70 Results indicate that a capital trial at that time cost
an estimated $147,700 more than a noncapital trial in that jurisdiction.71
Cook conducted a follow-up study, also in North Carolina, which employed
counterfactual logic to estimate the potential economic effect of abolition in
that state. 72 His findings suggested that the state would have saved an
estimated $11 million annually if capital punishment had been abolished in
July 2004. 73
Using a slightly different approach, Roman et al. attempted to control
for selection effects resulting from prosecutorial charging decisions by
analyzing the full universe of death-eligible murder cases in Maryland from
1978 to 1999 within a quasi-experimental framework. 74 Propensity scores
were used to match capital and noncapital murders along a number of caselevel characteristics in order to model the costs associated with the decision
67

JOHN K. ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INST., RESEARCH REPORT: THE COST OF THE DEATH
PENALTY IN MARYLAND 534–35 (2008) [hereinafter RESEARCH REPORT], available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411625_md_death_penalty.pdf.
68
JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 95–
99 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing omitted variable bias in social science research more generally).
69
Gradess & Davies, supra note 55, at 397; ROMAN ET AL., RESEARCH REPORT, supra
note 67, at 531.
70
PHILIP J. COOK ET AL., TERRY SANFORD INST. OF PUB. POL’Y, DUKE UNIV., THE COSTS
OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA (2012), available at http://www.goccp.
maryland.gov/capital-punishment/documents/cook-materials.pdf.
71
Id. at 2–3.
72
Philip J. Cook, Potential Savings from Abolition of the Death Penalty in North
Carolina, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 498 (2009) [hereinafter Potential Savings].
73
Id. at 499.
74
See ROMAN ET AL., RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 67, at 533; Roman et al.,
Reassessing the Cost of the Death Penalty, supra note 66, at 530.
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to seek the death penalty. 75 Upon successful completion of propensityscore matching, the researchers estimated a series of regression equations
corresponding to various stages of the capital punishment process.76
Results from two-sampled t-tests indicated that capital cases involve
significantly longer hearings and trials at the guilt phase and in
Moreover, capital cases have
postconviction appeal proceedings. 77
significantly more postconviction appeals.78 An Ordinary Least Squares
regression model was then used to evaluate the cost differential between
capital and noncapital cases.79 Coefficients indicate that the trial and
appellate review process is significantly more costly for capital cases
compared to noncapital cases. 80
While the extant death penalty cost literature has effectively helped to
dispel the popular myth that capital punishment is cheaper than LWOP, it
remains limited in several respects.81 Only five out of the fourteen cost
studies reviewed by Roman et al. compared death-eligible (i.e., capital and
special circumstance cases) to non-death-eligible cases at the county level,
and none of those utilized multiple regression techniques. 82 To date,
Roman et al.’s analysis 83 of Maryland’s death penalty system is the only
multiple regression study at the county level.
Nonetheless, what is clear from the existing cost literature is that
additional expenses begin to accrue as soon as the decision to seek death is
made by the prosecutor. As noted above, under California’s scheme, the
filing of one or more special circumstance allegations fundamentally alters
the course of a homicide case by making it death eligible. 84 As a result, a
large portion of the county-level costs associated with the death penalty are
put in motion by those charging decisions.
75

Roman et al., Reassessing the Cost of the Death Penalty, supra note 66, at 533.
Id. at 554.
77
Id. at 562.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 551.
80
Id. at 569–70.
81
See Gradess & Davies, supra note 55, at 397, 411.
82
Roman et al., Reassessing the Cost of the Death Penalty, supra note 66, at 535; see
also, e.g., STATE OF KAN. LEGISLATIVE DIV. OF POST AUDIT, COSTS INCURRED FOR DEATH
PENALTY CASES: A K-GOAL AUDIT OF THE DEP’T OF CORR. (2012), available at
http://www.kslpa.org/docs/reports/04pa03a.pdf; JOHN G. MORGAN ET AL., TENN.
COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, TENNESSEE’S DEATH PENALTY’S COSTS AND
CONSEQUENCES (2012), available at http://www.comptroller1.state.tn.us/repository/RE/
deathpenalty.pdf; COOK ET AL., THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH
CAROLINA, supra note 70; Cook, Potential Savings, supra note 72, at 24–25.
83
See ROMAN ET AL., RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 67; Roman et al., Reassessing the
Cost of the Death Penalty, supra note 66.
84
See supra Table 1.
76
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Once the DA’s office decides to file a death notice, the costs of
proceeding continue to mount. Because in such cases the defense must
prepare not only for the guilt phase, but also for a penalty phase, the
American Bar Association recommends that a four-member defense team
consisting of two attorneys and two investigators be assigned to each capital
case. 85 As the case proceeds to trial, the requirement that a death-qualified
jury be seated in a capital case means that extensive voir dire must be
performed to ensure that any potential juror is excluded from the capital
case if his death penalty attitude could “prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and
his oath.” 86
The Supreme Court has also ruled that defense attorneys are entitled to
present information regarding the defendant’s life history to capital jurors
before they determine whether or not death is an appropriate punishment. 87
As a result, defense attorneys devote a considerable amount of resources to
the preparation of a defendant’s life history, which often includes hiring a
range of expert witnesses who can testify about elements of the life
While these procedures are necessary for ensuring that
history. 88
constitutional requirements are achieved, they make capital cases
significantly more costly than noncapital cases.
In the case of California, data limitations, in part due to the absence of
a comprehensive system for tracking county-level data, have stifled efforts
to calculate with precision these pre-adjudication costs of capital
punishment. 89 Accordingly, researchers have had to calculate costs using
several sources, some of which vary in accuracy and comprehensiveness.
Erickson’s comparative analysis of “middle range” death-eligible cases
from Los Angeles County provides one of the most comprehensive
tabulations of capital punishment trial costs in California.90 Erickson
85
MINSKER, THE HIDDEN DEATH TAX, supra note 34, at 7; see also CCFAJ, supra note 1,
at 42–43.
86
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 420 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38,
45 (1980)); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522–23 (1968).
87
See CARTER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW, supra note 17, at
132; Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of
Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 559 (1994) [hereinafter The Social Context of
Capital Murder].
88
COOK ET AL., THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra
note 70, at 11, 33–43, 44–60. See generally Emily Hughes, Arbitrary Death: An Empirical
Study of Mitigation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 581 (2012) (discussing ABA guidelines for
mitigation investigation and the significant weight given to using mitigation specialists in
capital cases).
89
EVERINGHAM, supra note 1, at 1, 6–8.
90
David Erickson, Capital Punishment at What Price: An Analysis of the Cost Issue in a
Strategy to Abolish the Death Penalty 19–26 (1993) (master’s thesis, University of
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calculated the costs of capital punishment by compiling financial
information from a variety of criminal justice agencies using a sample of
nineteen “typical” death-eligible cases involving one or more special
circumstance allegations. 91 In the early 1990s, capital cases were estimated
to cost $1.2 million more than comparable noncapital death-eligible cases. 92
A detailed breakdown of these specific costs throughout the various stages
of the capital punishment process vividly reveals the financial burden that
capital cases place on county-level criminal justice systems. At the pretrial
stage, the cost differential stems from death qualification of a jury and
The prolonged process of death
defense attorney appointments. 93
qualification costs the county an additional $56,706 per case compared to
the noncapital jury-selection procedure. 94 The complexity of capital cases
requires the appointment of specialized defense attorneys at a rate of about
$324,665 per case compared to a rate of $78,273 per noncapital case. 95
Comparable estimates for the salary costs of prosecutors, investigators, and
expert witnesses could not be calculated. The number of days spent in
court is another source of disparity. On average, death penalty cases
involve 120 more court days than noncapital cases, at a rate of $3,589 per
court day. 96
C. THE COST–DISCRETION NEXUS
Because prosecutorial discretion in filing special circumstances is so
vast in California (in that approximately 87% of first-degree murder cases
meet the criteria for one or more special circumstances), the pretrial and
trial costs may well exceed most other death penalty jurisdictions. 97 A
related consequence of the broad statute is that the threat of capital
punishment is much more widespread in California, thus providing a
powerful, albeit expensive, tool in the prosecutor’s arsenal.
It appears that a few special circumstance allegations, in particular,
account for the majority of death-eligible homicides in the state. The

California, Berkeley), available at http://www.deathpenalty.org/downloads/Erickson1993
COSTSTUDY.pdf.
91
Id. at 38–39.
92
Id. at 3.
93
Id. at 21–22.
94
Id. at 21. The enhanced cost of death qualification is $56,706 per case (the difference
between $68,909 for jury selection in death penalty cases versus $12,203 for non-death
penalty cases).
95
Id. at 22.
96
Id. at 21.
97
See CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 18; Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 8, at 1331.
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felony-murder special circumstance 98 was found in the vast majority of
death penalty cases prosecuted in Alameda County99 and in those appealed
statewide. 100 In addition, felony-murder was the most common special
circumstance filed against death row inmates from 1997 to 2007. 101
Felony-murder and other overbroad special circumstances increase the
chances of racial bias and error by bolstering prosecutorial discretion. 102
For instance, Radelet and Pierce’s analysis of charges filed in Florida
homicide cases between 1973 and 1977 indicates that black defendants
accused of killing whites are significantly more likely to have their crime
“upgraded” from non-felony-murder to felony-murder than other
defendant–victim racial combinations. 103
Adding to the problem is that despite California’s overbroad deatheligibility scheme, there is no statutory requirement that prosecutors
indicate whether or not they intend to file a death notice.104 Nonetheless,
under California Rule of the Court 8.613(b), prosecutors are presumed to be
seeking the death penalty in special circumstance cases unless the DA’s
office formally indicates otherwise, 105 so defense attorneys are required to
prepare these cases for capital litigation.
Prior research has largely overlooked the influence of overbroad
charging practices on cost outcomes. The few studies that have examined
costs at the county level mainly focused on the differential between capital
and special circumstance cases, ignoring differences between special
circumstance and non-special circumstance cases. The paucity of research
on this topic has significant policy implications given Roman et al.’s
finding that attorneys spend a substantial amount of time and energy
preparing death-eligible cases for capital litigation in which the death
penalty is not ultimately sought. 106
Because prosecutors often seek to maximize conviction rates when
making charging decisions, 107 they may use special circumstance filings as
98

CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(17) (West 2008).
Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 8, at 1334–35; Shatz, supra note 18, at 737–45.
100
Shatz, supra note 18, at 738–45.
101
KREITZBERG, supra note 30, at 10.
102
Id. at 48.
103
Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in
Homicide Cases, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 587, 607–15 (1985) [hereinafter Race and
Prosecutorial Discretion].
104
Abernathy v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 726, 730 n.5 (Ct. App. 2007)
(“Subdivision (a)(2) of section 190.9 specifies certain procedures when the prosecutor gives
notice of intention to seek the death penalty; however, it does not require such notice.”).
105
CAL. R. CT. 8.613(b).
106
ROMAN ET AL., RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 67, at 570–71.
107
Celesta A. Albonetti, Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening, and Uncertainty: Toward
99
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a tactical tool, broadly filing death-eligible charges at the beginning stages
of the process and subsequently deciding which cases will be prosecuted
capitally based on the odds of securing a guilty verdict (and more
specifically, a death sentence). This sort of strategic maneuver is
advantageous to prosecutors for several reasons. Foremost, by filing at
least one special circumstance allegation in a wide range of cases,
prosecutors are afforded a considerable amount of flexibility when
responding to community sentiment. For instance, prosecutors can file
special circumstance allegations during the initial charging stage, and then
gauge whether or not public outrage surrounding a particular case warrants
the filing of a death notice.
The filing of special circumstance allegations in a wide range of cases
may also augment prosecutors’ bargaining power in plea negotiations.108
The informal structure of plea bargaining allows prosecutors and defense
attorneys to formulate several iterations of plea agreements before a
consensus is reached between both parties. 109 The recursive nature of this
process allows defense attorneys to negotiate the best possible pleas for
their clients. In death-eligible cases, however, the negotiation process is
severely undercut by the unequal power differential between the defense
and prosecution. Defense attorneys’ decisions are often dictated by
prosecutors’ ability to leverage aggravating circumstances and a death
notice. When a special circumstance allegation is filed, defense attorneys
are left with two options—advise their clients to plead guilty or run the risk
of advancing to a capital trial by rejecting the plea bargain. The lack of plea
options available in death-eligible cases may force a defendant to accept a
guilty plea that will result in an LWOP sentence in order to avoid the risk of
receiving a death sentence at trial.
Two recent empirical studies demonstrate the potentially coercive
nature of plea negotiations in death-eligible cases. Kuziemko used the
a Theory of Discretionary Decision Making in Felony Case Processings, 24 CRIMINOLOGY
623, 626 (1986) [hereinafter Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening, and Uncertainty]; Celesta
A. Albonetti, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Effects of Uncertainty, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
291, 295 (1987) [hereinafter Prosecutorial Discretion]; William M. Landes, An Economic
Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 62 n.2 (1971); Eric Rasmusen et al., Convictions
Versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor’s Choice, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 47, 53–61
(2009).
108
See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE
AND MISTAKE 53 (2d ed. 1981); Robert M. Bohm, The Economic Costs of Capital
Punishment: Past, Present, and Future, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL
SANCTION 573, 578 n.6 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter AMERICA’S
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT].
109
Debra S. Emmelman, Trial by Plea Bargain: Case Settlement as a Product of
Recursive Decisionmaking, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 335, 356–57 (1996).
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reinstatement of New York State’s capital punishment system in 1995 as a
naturalistic experiment of capital plea-bargaining practices.110 Data on
first-degree and second-degree murder cases filed in New York State from
1995 to 2000 was used to examine the effect of capital punishment on a
defendant’s propensity to plead guilty. Results indicate that defendants
prosecuted in counties that actively sought the death penalty were more
likely to plead guilty to their original arraignment charges than defendants
prosecuted in non-death penalty counties; that is, defendants charged in
active death penalty counties in New York are more likely to accept harsher
plea agreements. 111 However, the threat of capital punishment does not
appear to increase a defendant’s overall propensity to plead guilty. 112
Ehrhard’s qualitative analysis of plea-bargaining practices in an
unidentified state sheds light on the interactional dynamics involved in
capital plea agreements.113 Results from a series of open-ended interviews
with prosecutors and defense attorneys indicate that the death penalty is
frequently used to induce guilty pleas.114 As one defense attorney candidly
notes:
[P]rosecutors “say they don’t” but “do, absolutely” use the threat of death as leverage
to induce a plea, this is “one of the most duplicitous parts of the process in my book,
when you go in for a plea on a case that is capital eligible or on which a notice has
been filed and they require the client to say that I’m pleading knowingly, freely, and
voluntarily and ‘no, I haven’t been coerced.’ Bull-shit you haven’t been coerced.” 115

Another defense attorney claimed that plea bargaining in death-eligible
cases rarely involves a sentence of life with the possibility of parole: “I
don’t know anybody who pleads to life with parole. It’s always LWOP
versus the death penalty.” 116 The majority of defense attorneys noted that
the choice between an LWOP sentence and the possibility of advancing to a
capital trial led them to advise their clients to plead guilty in order to avoid
the death penalty. Many defense attorneys were fully aware of the power
differential created by the threat of capital charges, characterizing plea
agreements in death-eligible cases as “take it or leave it” endeavors rather
than actual “negotiations.” 117 Prosecutors also acknowledged that the threat
110

Ilyana Kuziemko, Does the Threat of the Death Penalty Affect Plea Bargaining in
Murder Cases? Evidence from New York’s 1995 Reinstatement of Capital Punishment, 8
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 116, 116–19 (2006).
111
Id. at 125–30.
112
Id.
113
See generally Ehrhard, supra note 29, at 313–25 (providing an empirical analysis of
this issue).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 316.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 318.
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of capital punishment is frequently used to induce a guilty plea, even
though nearly all denied ever engaging in such activities. 118 Ultimately, the
unequal power structure created by the capital plea-bargaining process may
undermine defendants’ rights regardless of whether or not prosecutors
intentionally coerce defendants with the threat of capital charges.
While prosecutors engage in a cost–benefit analysis when deciding
how to charge and pursue cases, 119 the risk of losing in a capital case is
mitigated by the fact that death-qualified juries are more conviction-prone
than regular criminal juries. Thus, the chances of getting a conviction,
particularly in cases in which multiple special circumstances can be filed,
are enhanced. 120 In addition, prosecutors often focus on maximizing their
chances of conviction while minimizing the risks of a trial, and thus they do
not necessarily consider the financial impact their charging decisions will
have on the courts over the long run, even if the case ultimately ends in a
plea agreement. 121
118

Id. at 319–23.
See generally Albonetti, Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening, and Uncertainty,
supra note 107; Albonetti, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 107; Landes, supra note
107; Rasmusen et al., supra note 107 (examining the cost–benefit analysis conducted by
prosecutors).
120
This effect has been empirically demonstrated by at least three factors. First, death
qualification excludes minorities and women at disproportionate rates and these
demographic factors are correlated with conviction-proneness, in that white men are more
conviction-prone than others. Second, the death-qualification process itself biases those
subject to it in favor of conviction. Third, support for the death penalty is highly correlated
with other attitudes about justice, due process, and crime control, such that death-qualified
jurors have lower evidentiary thresholds for proof of guilt, and higher tolerance for false
convictions than non-qualified jurors. For a review, see Mona Lynch, The Social
Psychology of Capital Cases, in 1 JURY PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL PROCESSES,
at 157, 163–65 (Joel D. Lieberman & Daniel A. Krauss eds., 2009). See generally Joseph
W. Filkins et al., An Evaluation of the Biasing Effects of Death Qualification: A MetaAnalytic/Computer Simulation Approach, in THEORY AND RESEARCH ON SMALL GROUPS 153,
161–65 (R. Scott Tindale et al. eds., 1998) (reporting on a small effect size for convictionproneness overall, and a larger effect size for the exclusion of minorities as a result of death
qualification); Craig Haney et al., “Modern” Death Qualification: New Data on Its Biasing
Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 619, 624–30 (1994) (reporting findings on the demographic
impacts of death qualification, based on a California sample); William C. Thompson et al.,
Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes into
Verdicts, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95, 106–09 (1984) (reporting on the constellation of
attitudes that make death-qualified juries more conviction prone). Relatedly, see Marla
Sandys, Stacking the Deck for Guilt and Death: The Failure of Death Qualification to
Ensure Impartiality, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 108,
at 385, 402–06 (discussing the overinclusion of excludable “automatic death penalty” jurors,
who are especially likely to be conviction-prone).
121
In some instances, prosecutors consider capital punishment costs when making
charging decisions (e.g., Baicker, supra note 32, at 3, 13, and Rupp, supra note 32, at 2758–
61), yet in others, they ignore such financial concerns (e.g., Russell Gold, Counties Struggle
119
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II. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
This study attempts to assess the potential time-costs and
consequences associated with Los Angeles County’s death penalty system
by drawing insights from a data set of 7,258 defendants charged with
murder (PC § 187) or voluntary manslaughter (PC § 192(a)) between 1996
and 2008. This data set was obtained directly from the Los Angeles County
DA’s Office via a public records request. There are two advantages to
focusing on Los Angeles County homicide cases. First, the Los Angeles
County DA’s Office is the largest prosecutorial agency in the United
States, 122 making it an ideal locale for studying the time-costs of capital
punishment. Second, Los Angeles County sentences more defendants to
death than any other county in California. 123 Approximately 30% of all
capital cases in California originate in Los Angeles County. 124
Because prior research indicates that homicide cases that result in
second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter charges at adjudication
are often factually death eligible, we included all homicide cases involving
charges of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary
manslaughter. 125 Homicide cases that were filed by the DA’s office but
were later dismissed are excluded from the data set as they do not belong to
the sample of interest (i.e., cases actually processed through the court
system). In contrast, defendants who were initially charged with murder or
voluntary manslaughter but subsequently had these charges downgraded to
a lower offense such as involuntary manslaughter are included in the
sample. Defendants represent the basic unit of analysis. Defendants tried
within a multiple-defendant case are treated as statistically dependent
observations. 126 Clustered standard errors were calculated using Stata’s
“vce (cluster id)” command to account for “clustering among prosecutors,
defense attorneys and judges, all of which might reasonably be related to
the cost of a case.” 127

With High Cost of Prosecuting Death-Penalty Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2002, at B1).
122
See L.A. CNTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, http://da.lacounty.gov/default.htm (last
visited Sep. 23, 2012).
123
See CONDEMNED INMATE LIST, supra note 22 (this figure was calculated by dividing
the number of death-row inmates sentenced in Los Angeles County by the total number of
California death-row inmates).
124
See id.
125
Baldus et al., supra note 17, at 160.
126
Id. at 157.
127
Roman et al., Reassessing the Cost of the Death Penalty, supra note 66, at 568; see
also LAWRENCE C. HAMILTON, STATISTICS WITH STATA: UPDATED FOR VERSION 10, at 254
(2009); STATACORP, STATA USER’S GUIDE RELEASE 11, at 300–02 (11th ed. 2009)
[hereinafter STATACORP].

1254

NICHOLAS PETERSEN & MONA LYNCH

[Vol. 102

A. LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING THE FILING OF A DEATH
NOTICE AMONG DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES
In this section we develop a logistic regression model to examine
death-notice filings among death-eligible cases. California’s extensive list
of statutorily defined aggravating circumstances provides prosecutors with
considerable leeway in determining which cases will become death
eligible. 128 A similar degree of prosecutorial discretion surrounds the
selection of capital cases from the wide range of death-eligible cases. In the
absence of statewide standards for the filing of death notices, each DA has
developed her own protocol for selecting capital cases. 129 This has led to
considerable variation in the process of filing special circumstance
allegations and death notices. 130
In this context, an important policy question arises: What legally
relevant factors do prosecutors use to select capital cases and how does this
selection method influence the processing of homicide cases within Los
Angeles County’s court system? The filing of a death notice has profound
financial implications for prosecution of other criminal cases within the
same county; 131 therefore, the selection process is particularly relevant to
the handling of all homicide cases. Because prosecutors generally seek to
maximize their conviction rates and in capital cases they strive to obtain
death sentences, it is hypothesized that the special circumstance committee
will be more likely to file a death notice in cases containing multiple special
circumstance allegations. On the other hand, the odds of a death-notice
filing may be higher for multiple special circumstance cases because the
special circumstance committee perceives them to be more serious.
Measures of case seriousness and criminal history were added to the model
in order to test this alternative hypothesis.
B. COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD REGRESSION PREDICTING
TIME-TO-RESOLUTION
The dependent variable analyzed in Models 2–4 is time-to-resolution
(measured as the number of calendar days from a case’s filing date to its
resolution date). 132 For pending cases, time-to-resolution is measured as the
128
129
130

at 4–6.

See CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 17; Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 8, at 1331.
Letter from Natasha Minsker, supra note 15, at 4–6.
CALDWELL ET AL., supra note 30, at 5–6; Letter from Natasha Minsker, supra note 15,

131
Garey, supra note 62, at 1254–55; see also Gradess & Davies, supra note 55, at 407–
09; Charles S. Lanier et al., Introduction and Overview—The Future of America’s Death
Penalty: An Agenda for the Next Generation of Capital Punishment Research, in THE
FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 3, 7.
132
A total of 297 cases were resolved through consolidation. In addition, eighty-one
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number of calendar days from the filing date to the last date in the data set
(November 7, 2008). 133 The use of time-to-resolution as a proxy measure
for cost is justified on several grounds. Foremost, county-level financial
data on capital cases is often unreliable. 134 In addition, a large proportion of
the cost differential between capital and noncapital homicide cases stems
from the fact that capital cases simply take longer to reach resolution. 135
According to Roman et al.: “The majority (70%) of the cost differential
between a death-notice and a non-death-notice case occurs during the trial
phase. This difference is due to a greater number of pre-trial motions,
longer and more intensive voir dire, longer trials and a greater amount of
general preparation time.” 136 Using time-to-resolution as a proxy measure
for cost also provides methodological advantages. Estimates based on a
small sample of “average” capital cases likely suffer from measurement
error due to the fact that criminal justice officials find it difficult to
accurately assess which cases are “typical.” 137 Therefore, models using a
time-to-resolution dependent variable likely produce more reliable
estimates of the potential cost differential between death-eligible and nondeath-eligible cases than those based on a small sample of “average” cases.
Two hypotheses regarding the time-to-resolution measure were
derived from the extant literature. As previously noted, the implementation
cases contained sentencing information, but were listed as “filed” or “charges consolidated”
in the DA’s data set. However, because these cases had sentencing information, they were
coded as resolved. The substantive conclusions of Models 2–4 do not change when these
378 cases are coded as right-censored (i.e., pending) or excluded.
133
Cases filed on the last date of data collection (November 7, 2008) were coded as
right-censored and given a time-to-resolution value of 1, since each defendant “survived” at
least one day.
134
CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 39, 96–98; EVERINGHAM, supra note 1, at 3–4; Letter from
Natasha Minsker, supra note 15, at 4–6.
135
COOK ET AL., THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra
note 70, at 2; TERANCE D. MIETHE, ESTIMATES OF TIME SPENT IN CAPITAL AND NON-CAPITAL
MURDER CASES: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA FROM CLARK COUNTY DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS 2–5 (2012), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/ClarkNV
CostReport.pdf.
136
ROMAN ET AL., RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 67, at 30. The time-to-resolution
measure represents a critical component of most cost studies. See id. at 18. For example,
Roman and colleagues calculated costs using the following formula: “Cost = Price of unit of
input X Quantity of inputs.” Id. According to this formula, price and quantity are calculated
separately such that cost is defined as the “price of an hour of an attorney’s time . . .
multipl[ied] . . . by the number of hours spent by that attorney in each stage of case
processing.” Id. Likewise, Miethe calculates the capital costs as the product of attorney
wages and attorney hours spent preparing a particular case. MIETHE, supra note 135, at 8–9.
Our data does not contain a breakdown of the time spent during each phase of the case
processing, and it is thus not possible to calculate the costs associated with various stages of
the pretrial and trial processes.
137
EVERINGHAM, supra note 1, at 5.
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of procedural safeguards in capital cases (e.g., appointment of special
counsel, death qualification, additional motions, etc.) dramatically increases
the amount of time devoted to pretrial investigations and litigation
efforts. 138 As such, it is hypothesized that capital cases will take
significantly longer to reach resolution than noncapital cases. Roman et
al.’s survey results suggest that special circumstance cases take longer to
reach resolution than non-special circumstance cases.139 In addition,
California Rule of the Court 8.613(b) requires that defense attorneys
prepare special circumstance cases for the possibility of capital
prosecution. 140 Accordingly, we predict that special circumstance cases
will take significantly longer to reach resolution than non-special
circumstance cases.
Cox Proportional Hazard (PH) regression was used to estimate the
effect of covariates on time-to-resolution. The main advantage of Cox PH
regression over parametric survival analysis techniques (exponential,
Weibull, gamma, etc.) is that it does not require specification of the baseline
hazard rate, thereby minimizing the possibility of misspecification with
regard to the baseline rate. 141 In comparison to Ordinary Least Squares
regression, Cox PH regression more effectively addresses non-normality in
the outcome variable as well as censoring. 142 Cox PH regression produces
coefficient estimates in the form of a hazard ratio; values larger than 1
imply an increase in the hazard (and thus a decrease in survival time), while
hazard ratios less than 1 indicate a decrease in the hazard rate (and thus an
increase in survival time). 143 Hazard ratios can also be interpreted as a
percentage change in the hazard rate using the following formula: [exp β(xi
= X1) – exp β(xi = X2) / exp β(xi = X2)]*100. 144
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
In order to faciliate policy-relevant comparisons between various types
of homicide cases, we use several measures of death penalty status and
death eligibility. The main predictors of interest for Models 2–4 were
dichotomously coded as follows: (a) capital case (1 = death notice filed and
0 = no death notice filed); (b) special circumstance case (1 = at least one
138

CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 22–23; ROMAN ET AL., RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 67, at
9–15; Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 21, at S75–S78; Erickson, supra note 90, at 11.
139
Roman et al., Reassessing the Cost of the Death Penalty, supra note 66, at 569–71.
140
See supra text accompanying note 105.
141
JANET M. BOX-STEFFENSMEIER & BRADFORD S. JONES, EVENT HISTORY MODELING: A
GUIDE FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 47 (2004).
142
Id. at 16–18.
143
Id. at 50, 59–61.
144
See id. at 60.
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special circumstance but no death notice filed and 0 = no special
circumstance filed); (c) single special circumstance case (1 = one special
circumstance but no death notice filed and 0 = no special circumstance
filed); and (d) multiple special circumstance case (1 = two or more special
circumstances but no death notice filed and 0 = no special circumstance
filed). For Model 1, the multiple special circumstance variable was coded
in a slightly different manner (1 = two or more special circumstances filed
and 0 = single special circumstance filed).
Models 1–4 utilize many of the same independent variables because
measures of case complexity and offense severity are likely related to both
the filing of a death notice and time-to-resolution. In general, cases
involving serious offenses (e.g., multiple counts, sentencing enhancements,
etc.) are more complex to the extent that they require additional procedural
safeguards and greater logistical coordination between criminal justice
agencies (e.g., courts, prosecutors, etc.). Greater case complexity, in turn,
requires that attorneys dedicate additional time to pretrial investigative
work and the filing of motions at trial. Measures of complexity and offense
severity are included to help rule out alternative explanations for observed
differences in the probability of a death-notice filing and time-to-resolution
hazard rate.
The number of criminal counts was logarithmically
transformed to model its diminishing effect. Cases involving multiple
criminal counts likely contain more witnesses and evidentiary exhibits at
trial, thereby requiring additional pretrial preparation and motions at trial.
Likewise, it would seem that cases involving numerous counts are more
likely to elicit public outrage, and thus have a higher probability of
receiving a death notice.
The following sentencing enhancements were added to Models 1–4 to
control for case seriousness/complexity: prior prison term sentencing
enhancement (PC § 667.5(a)); habitual offender sentencing enhancement
(PC § 667(a)(1)); and gang sentencing enhancement (PC § 186.22(b)).
Cases with multiple defendants may take longer to reach resolution because
they require greater logistical coordination between various criminal justice
actors and agencies. In contrast, multiple defendant variables were
excluded from Model 1 because there is no apparent reason why the
presence of multiple defendants would be related to the probability of
receiving a death notice. Lastly, defendant gender (1 = male and 0 =
female) was included in Model 1. 145 Defendant gender was excluded from
Models 2–4 because it would logically seem to have little impact on the
145
The data set included no other demographic data, so we were unable to control for
factors that may well be important to prosecutorial decisionmaking, including defendant and
victim race. See generally Pierce & Radelet, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors,
supra note 31, at 19–25 (analyzing race as a factor in prosecutorial decisionmaking).
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length of a case.
Organizational, political, and caseload factors are relevant to both the
filing of a death notice and time-to-resolution. To control for unobserved
annual differences in organizational factors, a series of dummy variables
were included for each file-year from 1997 to 2008 (the reference file-year
category is 1996). Cases filed in years with a heavy caseload may take
longer to reach resolution due to backlogs in the courts. Similarly, cases
prosecuted in file-years with a high homicide rate might be either less likely
to involve a death notice due to resource drain or more likely to involve a
death notice due to political pressure stemming from a high homicide rate.
D. MISSING DATA
A total of 531 cases (7% of the sample) are missing allegation
information and eleven defendants had no recorded gender. Among these
defendants with missing allegation information, twenty-four were
prosecuted capitally. In addition, twelve capital defendants had allegation
information but were not charged with at least one special circumstance
allegation. The DA’s office was contacted several times regarding this
matter, but officials did not comment on the error. The original data set
was left intact because the DA’s office was unwilling to provide additional
assistance in locating the source of this error. In other words, despite the
absence of allegation information, these thirty-six defendants were coded as
capital defendants charged with one special circumstance. This is a
reasonable approach given that capital cases are defined by the presence of
at least one special circumstance allegation and the filing of a death
notice. 146 In contrast, the number of special circumstance allegations for
each of these thirty-six defendants was coded as missing because there is no
reliable method for determining whether or not multiple special
circumstance allegations were filed.
Multiple imputations were used to fill in missing allegation and gender
information. The following binary variables were imputed ten times using
Stata’s “mi impute mvn” command: single special circumstance case,
multiple special circumstance case, prior prison term sentencing
enhancement, habitual offender sentencing enhancement, gang sentencing
enhancement, and defendant gender. Predictor variables in the imputation
equation included the following: time-to-resolution, death penalty case, two
defendants, three or more defendants, file-years 1997 through 2008, and
pending case. A second equation using the same predictors was used to
multiply impute the special circumstance variable ten times because it was
collinear with measures regarding the number of special circumstances
146

CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.2, 190.4 (West 2008).
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(single vs. multiple). Following the advice of StataCorp, 147 we rounded
down imputed values smaller than 0.50 to 0, while imputed values larger
than 0.50 were rounded up to 1. Accordingly, the final imputed variables
analyzed in Models 1–4 were dichotomously coded. The substantive results
of Models 1–4 are virtually the same when defendants with missing
information are excluded, suggesting that these observations do not bias
coefficient estimates (results not shown). Results from the multiply
imputed versions of Models 1–4 are presented below because they yield
more robust estimates due to the increase in statistical power stemming
from a larger sample size.
E. RESULTS
Summary statistics displayed in Table 1 indicate that death-eligible
cases tend to exhibit greater complexity along a number of dimensions.
The mean/median time-to-resolution is considerably longer for deatheligible defendants compared to non-death-eligible defendants. Deatheligible cases also have a larger number of defendants and criminal charges.
Sentencing enhancements for a prior prison term and habitual criminal
history are more likely to be filed in death-eligible cases. Non-special
circumstance cases have the largest percentage of sentencing enhancements
for gang activity. A large proportion of death-eligible cases contain a
felony-murder special circumstance (PC § 190.2(a)(17)) as either one of
many aggravating circumstances or as the sole aggravating circumstance.
However, capital cases are less likely to contain a felony-murder special
circumstance as the only aggravating circumstance. Given prior research
on prosecutorial discretion regarding the “upgrading” and “downgrading”
of felony-murder charges, 148 these patterns suggest that deputy DAs use
felony-murder allegations to increase the pool of death-eligible cases so that
at a later point, they can more selectively decide which cases will be
prosecuted capitally. Lastly, capital cases are more likely than special
circumstance cases to involve multiple special circumstance allegations.

147

See generally STATACORP LP, STATA MULTIPLE-IMPUTATION REFERENCE MANUAL
108–10 (11th ed. 2009) (describing this process).
148
See Radelet & Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 103, at 587,
607–15.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics by Case Type (N = 7258)
Case Type
Variable Name
Time-toResolution (in
Days)
Multiple
Special
Circumstancea
Log (Number
of Counts)
Two
Defendants
Three or More
Defendants
Gang
Enhancementa
Habitual
Offender
Enhancementa
Prior
Prison
Enhancementa
Male
Defendanta
Felony-Murder
Chargea
Felony-Murder
Charge as Only
Special
Circumstancea
Pending Case

Non-Special
Circumstance
Mean
Std.
(Median) Dev.
497.26
426.15
(398)

Special
Circumstance
Mean
Std.
(Median) Dev.
642.93
456.87
(550)

Capital
Mean
(Median)
961.04
(888)

Std.
Dev.
525.47

—

—

0.26

0.44

0.57

0.5

1.22

0.49

1.46

0.55

1.84

0.73

0.23

0.42

0.3

0.46

0.34

0.47

0.13

0.34

0.26

0.44

0.27

0.45

0.37

0.48

0.32

0.47

0.3

0.46

0.12

0.32

0.12

0.32

0.28

0.45

0.14

0.35

0.12

0.32

0.22

0.42

0.93

0.25

0.93

0.26

0.96

0.21

—

—

0.55

0.5

0.53

0.5

—

—

0.41

0.49

0.21

0.40

0.13

0.33

0.14

0.35

0.18

0.38

a. Some observations are missing. For details on the missing data strategy, see Part
II.D.
Note: Std. Dev. = standard deviation. Numbers are rounded to the second decimal
place.
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These figures have implications for detention costs associated with
homicide cases. Information obtained on a sample of three capital
defendants housed in the Los Angeles County jail during 2010 was used to
calculate detention costs. Financial records obtained from the California
Department of Finance through a public records request indicate that it cost
$77.17 per day to detain a capital inmate in the Los Angeles County jail
during 2010. Based on the median time-to-resolution displayed in Table 1,
the typical detention costs for each case type are as follows: (1) non-special
circumstance cases = $30,646 ($77 x 398 days); special circumstance =
$42,350 ($77 x 550 days); capital case = $68,376 ($77 x 888 days). 149
These estimates represent just one crude indicator of the cost differential
between capital and noncapital cases. In fact, these estimates are likely
conservative because they do not include additional travel costs borne each
day the defendant is transported between the county jail and courthouse as
part of the trial process. In addition to detention costs, there are a myriad of
factors that make capital cases more expensive than noncapital cases,
including the appointment of additional attorneys and investigators, the
death-qualification process, and extra court appearances.150 Capital cases
each require the appointment of two defense attorneys and investigators
hired to gather information on a defendant’s life history as mitigating
evidence. The jury-selection process involved in capital cases is more
complicated than that in noncapital cases, requiring that each juror be death
qualified. Attempts to calculate these additional costs were stymied by the
DA’s refusal to provide us with financial records for capital cases.

149
The median, rather than the mean, is used to calculate detention costs because it is
more resistant to extreme observations and pending cases. See MIETHE, supra note 135, at 1.
150
Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 21, at S75–S79; see also, e.g., CARTER ET AL., supra
note 17, at 16; ROMAN ET AL., RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 67, at 30; Haney, The Social
Context of Capital Murder, supra note 87, at 548 (observing that the capital punishment
process is “costly”); Letter from Natasha Minsker, supra note 15, at 6, 8–9 (considering
distinguishing factors of capital cases that may increase costs, including delay in deciding
whether to pursue the death penalty and relative uninvolvement of defense counsel); cf.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (holding that capital defendants have the
constitutional right to present evidence of relevant mitigating factors).
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Table 2
Funneling of Homicide Defendants by File-Yeara
FileYear

Defs.

DE
Defs.

(Defs.)
(DE
Defs.)

Capital
Defs.

(Capital
Defs.)
(DE
Defs.)

Condemned
Defs.

(Condemned
Defs.)
(Capital
Defs.)

1996 722
21%
53%
219 30%
45
24
1997 609
25%
32%
187 31%
47
15
1998 592
35%
16%
36%
210
33
12
1999 499
18%
36%
157 31%
28
10
2000 474
11%
47%
155 33%
17
8
2001 539
12%
40%
127 24%
15
6
2002 587
28%
07%
64%
166
11
7
2003 518
05%
75%
158 31%
8
6
2004 584
23%
37%
189 32%
43
16
2005 581
27%
13%
10%
157
21
2
2006 571
11%
36%
123 22%
14
5
b
Avg. 570.55 168 29%
25.64
15%
10.09
42%
2007 597
0.5%
0%
133 22%
6
0
2008 385
20%
0.4%
0%
76
3
0
a. Some observations are missing. For details on the missing data strategy,
see Part II.D.
b. File years 2007–2008 are excluded from mean calculations due to the
large number of pending cases.
Notes: Percentages are rounded to the second decimal place. Defs. =
Defendants; DE Defs. = Death-eligible defendants (capital and special
circumstance cases); Capital Defs. = Capital defendants; Condemned
Defs. = Defendants sentenced to death.
Table 2 indicates that the DA’s office files special circumstance
allegations in a wide range of homicide cases. On average, special
circumstance allegations were filed in approximately 29% of all homicide
cases between 1996 and 2006. This suggests that the DA’s office broadly
files special circumstance allegations during the beginning stages of the
charging process, deciding later which cases will be prosecuted capitally.
Among defendants charged with one or more special circumstance
allegations, about 15% were prosecuted capitally. Roughly 42% of capital
cases resulted in a death sentence during the period of analysis, and thus
valuable resources were spent preparing the other 58% of death penalty
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cases for capital litigation that did not result in a death sentence. Applying
Erickson’s 151 cost estimates to the figures in Table 2, without adjusting for
inflation, suggests that between 1996 and 2006, Los Angeles County spent
upwards of $338 million prosecuting capital cases ($1.2 million per death
penalty case multiplied by 282 death penalty cases). Of this $338 million,
roughly $205.2 million was spent prosecuting capital cases that did not
result in death sentences ($1.2 million per capital case multiplied by 171
capital cases that did not result in a death sentence). These estimates should
be interpreted cautiously given Erickson’s “average” case method; 152 in
other words, figures are indicative of the general resource drain imposed by
capital cases rather than a precise estimate of such costs. Although these
crude cost estimates are subject to a high degree of measurement error, they
vividly demonstrate the financial burden that capital cases place on Los
Angeles County’s budget.
Taken together, these summary statistics illustrate two ways in which
Los Angeles County’s charging scheme drains resources from the criminal
justice system: (1) preparing special circumstance cases for capital litigation
even though a death notice is not ultimately sought in the vast majority of
cases (85%); and (2) prosecuting capital cases in which a majority (58%) do
not result in a death sentence.
Model 1 supports the hypothesis that the special circumstance
committee seeks to maximize its conviction rate by seeking the death
penalty in multiple special circumstance cases. Compared to cases
involving a single special circumstance allegation, the odds of a deathnotice filing are 4.73 times higher for multiple special circumstance cases.
A defendant’s criminal history and the seriousness of the crime being
prosecuted also play a role in the decision to file a death notice. The odds
of a death-notice filing are 2.25 times higher for defendants charged with a
habitual-offender sentencing enhancement 153 compared to defendants who
were not charged with a habitual-offender enhancement.

151
152
153

See Erickson, supra note 90, at 3.
Id. at 19–26.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a)(1) (West 2008).
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Table 3
Logistic Regression Predicting a Death-Notice Filing
Among Death-Eligible Cases (N = 2057)
Model 1
Variable Name

Odds Ratio

Robust SE

Multiple Special
Circumstance Casea
Male Defendant
Log (Number of Counts)
Prior Prison Enhancement
Habitual Offender
Enhancement
Gang Enhancement
File-Year 1997b
File-Year 1998
File-Year 1999
File-Year 2000
File-Year 2001
File-Year 2002
File-Year 2003
File-Year 2004
File-Year 2005
File-Year 2006
File-Year 2007
File-Year 2008
Intercept
Adjusted Pseudo R2 = 0.153
*p < .05, **p < .01

4.733**

0.192

1.398
2.166**
1.358
2.251**

0.35
0.172
0.234
0.228

1.072
1.104
0.574
0.785
0.291*
0.317*
0.172**
0.12**
0.749
0.455
0.3*
0.095**
0.113**
0.03**

0.239
0.316
0.346
0.415
0.548
0.551
0.542
0.578
0.34
0.48
0.515
0.583
0.824
0.469

a. Reference = Single special circumstance case.
b. Reference =1996 for all file-year variables.
Notes: SE = standard error. Sample includes death-eligible cases only (i.e.,
those containing at least one special circumstance allegation). Estimates are
rounded to the third decimal place. Adjusted Pseudo R2 was derived using the
“mibeta” command in Stata. For all dichotomous variables, 1 represents the
presence of the relevant category (e.g., 1 = gang enhancement and 0 = no gang
enhancement).
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A one-unit increase in the log number of criminal counts charged against a
defendant corresponds to a 2.16 increase in the odds ratio of a death-notice
filing. Several file-year variables are significant at α = 0.05: 2000–2003
and 2006–2008. This may indicate that the special circumstance committee
takes agency-level caseload factors into account when deciding whether or
not to seek the death penalty. Conversely, this pattern could be attributable
to political (e.g., DA election cycles) or personnel (e.g., changes in the
number of deputy DAs, changes in personnel demographics, etc.) factors.
Special circumstance cases filed after 1999 are less likely to result in a
death notice than special circumstance cases filed in 1996. This pattern
may be due to the large number of homicides prosecuted in the late
1990s. 154
Table 4
Cox Proportional Hazard Regression Predicting
Time-to-Resolution (N = 7258)
Model 2
Variable
Name
Capital Casea
Special
Circumstance
Caseb
Single Special
Circumstance
Caseb
Multiple
Special
Circumstance
Caseb
Prior Prison
Enhancement
Habitual
Offender
Enhancement
Gang
Enhancement
Log (Number
of Counts)
154

Model 3

Model 4

Hazard
Ratio

Robust
SE

Hazard
Ratio

Robust
SE

Hazard
Ratio

Robust
SE

0.459**
—

0.059
—

0.439**
0.747**

0.06
0.034

0.391**
—

0.061
—

—

—

—

—

0.751**

0.038

—

—

—

—

0.577**

0.068

1.027

0.044

1.114

0.044

1.019

0.044

0.92

0.044

1.009

0.045

0.927

0.044

1.001

0.036

1.039

0.036

0.963

0.036

0.921**

0.026

1.026

0.027

0.98

0.027

See supra Table 2.
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Two
0.909**
0.036
1.031
0.036
0.963
0.037
Defendantsc
Three or
0.742**
0.047
0.872** 0.047
0.802** 0.047
More
Defendantsc
File-Year
1.199*
0.075
1.388*
0.076
1.186
0.077
1997d
File-Year
0.991
0.072
1.168
0.073
1.013
0.072
1998
File-Year
0.904
0.071
1.063
0.072
0.92
0.072
1999
File-Year
0.823*
0.075
0.964
0.077
0.832*
0.077
2000
File-Year
0.788**
0.072
0.894*
0.073
0.778** 0.073
2001
File-Year
0.791**
0.069
0.911** 0.069
0.796** 0.069
2002
File-Year
0.773**
0.074
0.908** 0.074
0.79**
0.074
2003
File-Year
0.653**
0.067
0.743** 0.068
0.654** 0.068
2004
File-Year
0.625**
0.07
0.716** 0.07
0.623** 0.07
2005
File-Year
0.709**
0.072
0.8**
0.072
0.705** 0.072
2006
File-Year
0.633**
0.094
0.753** 0.093
0.637** 0.093
2007
File-Year
0.804
0.182
1.135
0.182
0.805
0.182
2008
*p < .05, **p < .01
a. Reference for Model 2 = Noncapital cases (special circumstance and nonspecial circumstance cases). Reference for Models 3–4 = Non-special
circumstance case.
b. Reference = Non-special circumstance case.
c. Reference = Single-defendant case.
d. Reference = 1996 for all file-year variables.
Notes: SE = standard error. The Breslow method was used for ties.
Estimates are rounded to the third decimal place. For all dichotomous
variables, 1 represents the presence of the relevant category (e.g., 1 = gang
enhancement and 0 = no gang enhancement).
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Before estimating Cox PH regression models, we nonparametrically
analyzed differences in the survival functions for key variables using
stratified Wilcoxon log-rank tests. The following covariates were used for
stratification purposes: habitual offender enhancement, prior prison
enhancement, gang enhancement, number of counts, two defendants, three
or more defendants, and file-years (1996–2008). After controlling for these
strata variables, results from the stratified Wilcoxon log-rank tests indicate
that there are significant time-to-resolution differences between deatheligible and non-death-eligible defendants: capital case vs. noncapital case
(χ2 = 44.17, p < 0.01); capital case vs. non-special circumstance case (χ2 =
83.69, p < 0.01); special circumstance case vs. non-special circumstance
case (χ2 = 40.36, p < 0.01); single special circumstance and multiple special
circumstance cases vs. non-special circumstance cases (χ2 = 44.56, p <
0.01). 155 Although log-rank tests are nonparametric, they provide useful
summary information about the adjusted relationship between death
eligibility and time-to-resolution that does not rely on the proportional
hazards assumption. 156
Models 2–4 indicate that death-eligible cases take significantly longer
to reach resolution than non-death-eligible cases. 157 After controlling for
155
Stratified Wilcoxon log-rank tests were conducted using non-imputed data because
Stata does not allow the “sts test” command to be used with imputed data. Stata omitted
some observations from the log-rank tests because the strata for the file-year and number of
counts variables had too few failures. The substantive conclusions of the Wilcoxon log-rank
tests are nearly the same when these variables are not used for stratification purposes.
156
BOX-STEFFENSMEIER & JONES, supra note 141, at 131–37 (2004); DAVID MACHIN ET
AL., SURVIVAL ANALYSIS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 149 (2d ed. 2006).
157
Schoenfeld residual analyses of Models 2–4 using non-imputed data indicate that the
proportional hazards assumption is violated for several variables, including the following
covariates of interest: capital case, special circumstance case, single special circumstance
case, and multiple special circumstance case. These diagnostic results are not surprising
given that nonproportionality is commonplace in many social science fields. See BOXSTEFFENSMEIER & JONES, supra note 141, at 132, 136; see also Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier
& Christopher J. Zorn, Duration Models and Proportional Hazards in Political Science, 45
AM. J. POL. SCI. 972, 972 (2001); Judith D. Singer & John B. Willett, It’s About Time: Using
Discrete-Time Survival Analysis to Study Duration and the Timing of Events, 18 J. EDUC.
STAT. 155, 186 (1993); John B. Willett et al., The Design and Analysis of Longitudinal
Studies of Development and Psychopathology in Context: Statistical Models and
Methodological Recommendations, 10 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 395, 421 (1998). Despite
these indicators of nonproportionality, we present estimates from the Cox PH regression
below because they are most pertinent to our main research question: Do death-eligible
defendants take significantly longer to advance through the court system than non-deatheligible defendants? Cox PH regression estimates the average effect of covariates over time,
thereby providing a parsimonious picture of the relationship between death eligibility and
time-to-resolution. BOX-STEFFENSMEIER & JONES, supra note 141, at 131–37; MACHIN ET
AL., supra note 156, at 149; Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, supra, at 974–75. In this regard, as
Machin and colleagues note, a standard Cox PH model may be preferable to a Cox PH
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case complexity and file-year effects, capital cases take 54% longer to reach
resolution than comparable noncapital cases (special circumstance and nonspecial circumstance) (see Model 2). Cases involving one or more special
circumstance allegations take 25% longer to reach resolution than those
without a special circumstance (see Model 3). In other words, even when a
death-eligible case is not prosecuted capitally, the filing of one or more
special circumstances significantly increases the time-to-resolution by 25%.
The filing of multiple special circumstances also increases survival time.
According to Model 4, cases with a single special circumstance take 25%
longer to reach resolution than non-special circumstance cases, whereas
cases involving two or more special circumstances take 42% longer to reach
resolution than those without a special circumstance.
In addition to death eligibility, several measures of case complexity
and organizational capacity significantly predict time-to-resolution. Cases
involving three or more defendants (Models 2–4) and those with two
defendants (Model 2) have a lower hazard ratio than single-defendant cases.
Contrary to our hypotheses regarding case characteristics, only one measure
of offense severity was statistically significant—log (number of counts) in
Model 2. Many of the hazard ratios for file-years 2000 to 2007 are
significant and less than one. This pattern could possibly be attributed to
the large number of cases filed from 1996 to 1998 (see Table 2 above). The
large influx of cases filed from 1996 to 1998 may have created a backlog in
the court system that dramatically slowed down the time-to-resolution of
subsequent cases. In light of the large standard error associated with fileyear 2008, the hazard ratio for this variable is likely nonsignificant due to
the large number of pending cases filed in 2008.
III. DISCUSSION
These findings shed light on charging practices and their efficiency
costs in Los Angeles County. Summary statistics demonstrate that
prosecutors broadly file special circumstance allegations, deciding later
which cases will be prosecuted capitally. Results from Model 1 support our
hypothesis that the special circumstance committee seeks to maximize the
model with time interactions that addresses issues of nonproportionality if temporal changes
in the effect of covariates are not central to the analysis:
If the PH [proportional hazard] assumption is not valid in the data, one may use ‘time-varying
covariates’ in the Cox model to capture the non-PH . . . . However, the violation of this
[proportional hazard] assumption is not necessarily unacceptable. To assume PH is essentially to
estimate the effect of an independent variable averaged over time and ignore the possibility that
the effect may vary over time. A simple model based on the assumption of PH is sometimes
preferable to a more ‘correct’ but complex model if the added complexity does not identify
features of scientific or clinical significance.

MACHIN ET AL., supra note 156, at 149.
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odds of receiving a conviction by selectively filing death notices in cases
involving multiple special circumstance allegations. This pattern remains
robust even after controlling for other measures of criminal history and
seriousness of the offense.
Findings from Models 2–4 highlight the time-costs associated with the
prosecution of capital cases.
As hypothesized, capital cases take
significantly longer to reach resolution after controlling for measures of
case complexity and crime seriousness, and as a result resources are drained
from criminal justice agencies at the county level. Results confirm prior
bivariate research indicating that capital cases are more costly and timeconsuming at the pretrial and trial stages than similar noncapital cases.158
Our findings also indicate that the time-cost differential between deatheligible and non-death-eligible cases is a function of the intensity of
resources required to process capital and special circumstance cases rather
than an artifact of omitted variable bias resulting from the use of bivariate
techniques. In other words, these estimates illustrate that the effect of death
eligibility on time-to-resolution is robust across a range of contexts and
methodological approaches, thereby corroborating prior bivariate estimates.
Models 2–4 also underscore the importance of assessing infrastructure
costs associated with Los Angeles County’s death penalty system. Special
circumstance cases take significantly longer to reach resolution even when
prosecutors decline to seek the death penalty. Although it is not possible to
translate the coefficients from Models 2–4 into precise dollar amounts,
these results clearly highlight the time-costs associated with maintaining the
death penalty at the county level even when no death sentences are actively
being sought. Taken together, results from Models 1–4 suggest that a large
proportion of these costs are derived from single special circumstance cases
that had a low probability of ever being selected by the special circumstance
committee for capital prosecution. The costs of preparing special
circumstance cases for capital litigation are compounded by the fact that
two attorneys and two investigators must be assigned to death-eligible
cases. 159 The indirect costs associated with special circumstance allegations
are often overlooked by death penalty cost studies, but can dramatically
affect the operating budgets of criminal justice agencies at the county
level. 160 It is clear that unrestrained charging decisions place a financial
burden on the legal system given the large number of special circumstance
158
See CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 34–43; Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 21, at S41, S75;
Garey, supra note 62, at 1269; Erickson, supra note 90, at 3.
159
CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 42; MINSKER, THE HIDDEN DEATH TAX, supra note 34, at 7,
32.
160
See Gradess & Davies, supra note 55, at 409–11; Baicker, supra note 32, at 3; Rupp,
supra note 32, at 2754.
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cases filed each year.
These results challenge the California District Attorneys Association’s
(CDAA) claim that the use of capital plea bargaining lowers the costs of
prosecuting homicide cases by reducing the amount of time spent handling
cases at the trial and postconviction stages. During the August 17, 2011,
meeting of the California Assembly Appropriations Committee,
representatives from the CDAA went on the record in opposition to state
Senator Hancock’s death penalty abolition bill, arguing that if there were no
death penalty, prosecutors would lose the “plea bargain effect” because no
one would plead guilty to murder. 161 According to the CDAA, the abolition
of the death penalty would likely increase the costs of prosecuting homicide
cases by encouraging defendants to go to trial when they otherwise would
have pleaded guilty to LWOP or a lesser charge in an effort to avoid the
possibility of obtaining a death sentence. 162 The CDAA argues that this
increase in the rate of homicide trials would, in turn, lead to the allocation
of additional resources to homicide appeals.163 While this cost–benefit
analysis assumes that the costs of prosecuting death penalty cases will be
offset by increases in the number of potentially death-eligible cases that
result in plea agreements, it does not account for the considerable amount of
resources wasted preparing special circumstance cases for capital litigation
that will not result in a death-notice filing. Models 3 and 4 suggest that the
overbroad charging practices may increase the costs of prosecution, with
noncapital special circumstance cases taking significantly longer to reach
resolution than non-special circumstance cases. In fact, the number of
special circumstance cases filed each year is considerably larger than the
number of death penalty cases, and thus overbroad special circumstance
filings may have a larger impact on county-level budgets than the CDAA
acknowledges.
We recognize that studies such as ours have a number of inherent
limitations, largely due to the limited access to county-level prosecutors’
data granted to researchers, including ourselves. Given the administrative
nature of the data set, it contains few or no details pertaining to caseprocessing characteristics (e.g., number of motions filed, hourly estimates,
etc.) and defendant demographics (e.g., race, socioeconomic status, etc.). In
particular, the data set does not include a detailed breakdown of the total
number of hours spent by various criminal justice officials on each case
during the pretrial and trial processes or the costs associated with these
activities. As such, time-to-resolution was used as a proxy for cost, but we
161
162
163

California Legislative Hearings, supra note 53.
Id.
Id.
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are unable to translate that into an exact dollar amount. Despite this
drawback, the use of a time-to-resolution measure is the most reliable proxy
measure of cost given the lack of publicly available financial data at the
county level. 164 Furthermore, the time-to-resolution model conservatively
estimates death penalty time-costs since it does not account for increased
salary expenses associated with death-eligible cases and the additional
staffing required in such cases.
The restricted geographical scope of this study may lower the external
validity of model estimates. However, concerns over external validity are
counteracted by public policy implications. Nearly 30% of defendants on
California’s death row were sentenced in Los Angeles County, and
therefore estimates derived from Los Angeles County account for a large
portion of the variance in the time-costs associated with California’s death
penalty system. 165 Los Angeles County’s death penalty policies also have
national significance. In 2009, Los Angeles County distinguished itself by
sentencing the most defendants in the nation to death, sending 13 people to
death row. 166 Consequently, Los Angeles County beat out other countylevel jurisdictions nationally. 167 Indeed, only two states—Florida (15) and
Arizona (14)—surpassed the county’s number of death sentences in
2009. 168 Ultimately, Los Angeles County accounted for 12% of the
nation’s death sentences that year.169
IV. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Our results echo findings from a number of different kinds of analyses
of capital punishment costs. That is, these are resource-intensive endeavors
164

CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 34–43, 77–84, 96–104; MINSKER, THE HIDDEN DEATH TAX,
supra note 34, at 32.
165
See CONDEMNED INMATE LIST, supra note 22 (this figure was calculated by dividing
the number of death-row inmates sentenced in Los Angeles County by the total number of
California death-row inmates).
166
ACLU OF N. CAL., DEATH IN DECLINE ’09: A REPORT ON THE DEATH PENALTY i, 2–3
(2010), available at https://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/death_penalty/death_in_
decline_09.pdf (discussing the significance of Los Angeles County’s death penalty system in
California and throughout the nation); Carol J. Williams & Jack Leonard, California Death
Row Swells Despite Nationwide Decline in Death Sentences [Updated], L.A. TIMES (Dec.
16, 2009, 11:16 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/12/california-death-rowswells-as-execution-verdicts-drop-nationwide.html.
167
Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and its Ramifications, 92 B.U.
L. REV. 227, 281 (2012).
168
TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 8 (2010).
169
Id. In 2009, there were a total of 106 death sentences in the nation, 13 of which were
imposed in Los Angeles County. Accordingly, this figure was derived from the following
calculation: 13/106 = 0.1226 (rounded to 12%).
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that require major trade-offs at the local and state levels in order to fund
them. 170 On that front, excessive expenditures in this arena appear
particularly problematic. 171 However, costs are just one side of the question
about whether capital punishment is justified as a criminal justice policy.
Indeed, over the last few decades, many of the rationales espoused in
defense of the death penalty have been seriously called into question. Two
of the most frequently cited penological justifications for the death
penalty—deterrence and incapacitation—have largely been discredited by
recent criminological research. 172
Many of the econometric studies from “new deterrence” literature,
which claim to find a substantial capital punishment deterrent effect, suffer
from a host of methodological and theoretical flaws. 173 Once these
methodological and theoretical deficits are corrected, the general deterrent
effect of capital punishment disappears. 174 These limitations have led
criminologists to question conclusions drawn from the new deterrence
literature. For example, Radelet and Lacock’s 175 survey of seventy-six
eminent criminologists indicates that 88.2% of these individuals hold the
expert opinion that the extant scientific literature does not provide support
for a general deterrent effect of capital punishment. Risk-assessment
studies have also severely undercut the incapacitation justification for
capital punishment by demonstrating that the odds of repeat homicide
offenders are rare. 176 Lastly, the myth that death sentences are cheaper than
LWOP sentences has been debunked by the cost literature cited above. 177
One of the last remaining justifications for the death penalty in the
modern era is a variant of retribution theory based on claims about
“victims’ rights.” According to this perspective, application of the death
penalty demonstrates the state’s valuation of homicide victims and provides
friends and family members with a sense of closure from their suffering. 178
170

See Baicker, supra note 32, at 3; Rupp, supra note 32, at 2754.
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Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2005); Michael L. Radelet & Traci L.
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Although the psychological effects of executions on victims’ family
members have not been thoroughly evaluated, some researchers argue that
executions may further traumatize family members of homicide victims. 179
The emotionally protracted nature of capital cases often serves to
“revictimize” family members of homicide victims. 180
Moreover, the noneconomic costs of the death penalty, especially to
core values of justice, due process, and equal protection, have grown
increasingly apparent as the “modern” death penalty has lumbered on.
Systemic failures in ensuring the protection of capital defendants’ rights at
the trial level are made evident by the exceptionally high rates of procedural
error found in capital cases from across the country. 181 Most dramatically,
it has been discovered that a notable number of death penalty sentences
have been imposed upon factually innocent citizens. 182 Capital case
outcomes in a number of death penalty states, including California,
continue to reflect racially discriminatory patterns. 183 And, as detailed
above, death eligibility in many jurisdictions does not appear to be much
narrower than it was prior to Furman, especially in states like California
with broad capital statutes.184
In light of the “executioner’s waning defenses,” 185 coupled with these
kinds of documented justice failures, many states have decided to abolish or
fundamentally alter their capital punishment systems in order to redirect
taxpayer dollars to alternative public-safety efforts. 186 In 2007, then-New
Jersey Governor Jon Corzine signed a measure invalidating the state’s death
penalty system. 187 In a similar vein, New Mexico Governor Bill
179
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182
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Richardson signed legislation to repeal the death penalty in 2009, citing
financial concerns as a major rationale. In 2011, Illinois abolished the death
penalty, primarily because of the series of miscarriages of justice that had
been uncovered in the state, and due to its discriminatory application.188
The state has earmarked the cost savings for victim services and for lawenforcement training. Most recently, on April 25, 2012, Connecticut
abolished its death penalty system largely in response to concerns over
costs and wrongful convictions. 189
California is at a similar crossroads with regards to capital punishment.
As the CCFAJ report highlighted, from a policy perspective, refusing to
modify the current system is not a viable option. Our findings suggest that
the very existence of the death penalty as a charging option—as it is
codified in the state—ensures significant financial, efficiency, and justice
costs. The discretion to file special circumstances in the vast majority of
homicides makes for a very expensive tool in the prosecutorial arsenal that
undoubtedly impacts resource allocations to public safety, crime
Indeed, Los Angeles County’s
prevention, and victim services.190
prosecutorial charging patterns suggest that only a small percentage of
special circumstance cases are ultimately prosecuted capitally, 191 but the
time-costs begin to accrue as soon as those special circumstances are filed.
In light of the tenuous empirical support for capital punishment as a publicsafety tool and the high costs it exacts on the state, it is difficult to imagine
a justification for maintaining this “broken system” on any public policy
grounds. 192
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